By Walter L. Perry, John Gordon
Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have proven that U.S. forces desire more-effective ideas and techniques to behavior counterinsurgency. they'll probably face related, abnormal struggle strategies from destiny enemies. This monograph examines the character of the modern rebel chance and offers insights on utilizing operational research thoughts to help intelligence operations in counterinsurgencies.
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Additional info for Analytic Support to Intelligence in Counterinsurgencies
6 In the data, “found caches” are clearly identiﬁed as such. Caches not found are recorded in two ways: (1) if a mission to ﬁnd a cache failed to produce one, and (2) all other entries in the database. Intelligence Analysis 31 recent data so that when candidate factor values for a given observation are classiﬁed, the latest enemy tactic is accounted for. 2). Unlike in conventional operations where discerning enemy plans amounts to evaluating alternative courses of action, discerning enemy plans in an insurgency can be almost impossible at times because the enemy generally seizes opportunities to strike as they occur and because decisions occur at low levels and operations involve relatively few people and pieces of equipment.
The activities of the group may not even have crossed into the realm of the illegal. If they are noticed, group members could easily be mistaken for common criminals or essentially harmless crackpots. On the other hand, if the authorities do recognize the group as a budding insurgency intent on eventually overthrowing the government—and if they can ﬁnd the leaders—this is precisely the easiest point at which the insurgency can be nipped in the bud. One factor contributing to the survival of small, proto-insurgencies is that, in some cases, the threatened government may deny that an insurgency even exists and attempt either to ignore the problem or to ascribe it to a small group of unimportant crackpots or criminals.
The views must be tailored to the needs of each. COINCOP’s main purpose beyond providing situational awareness is to show targeting opportunities against insurgent networks, show intelligence needs and collection opportunities, and help advise on force-protection decisions. 1, includes four key display tools. The ﬁrst presents views tailored to commanders, displaying the overall insurgent order of battle (to the extent that it is understood). It also displays key vulnerabilities of and threats to friendly forces and tracks current plans to attack the networks in various ways.