By Benjamin S. Lambeth
This document files the phenomenal cross-service concord that the U.S. Air strength and U.S. army have gradually constructed of their behavior of built-in strike operations because the first Persian Gulf conflict in 1991. That shut concord contrasts sharply with the location that prevailed all through many of the chilly battle, while the 2 providers maintained separate and detailed working mindsets and lacked any major interoperability positive aspects.
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Extra resources for COMBAT PAIR: The Evolution of Air Force-navy Integration in Strike Warfare
As a result, the warﬁghting potential of the Navy’s carrier air wings and battle groups grew substantially compared to that of the typical battle group at the end of the Cold War a decade before. In a ﬁnal capstone measure to round out this steady progress toward total ﬂeetwide standardization that had begun in the wake of Desert Storm, a new Navy Fleet Forces Command was activated in October 2001 under the command of Admiral Robert Natter just as 16 Scott, “Fallon Becoming Navy’s Air Combat ‘Grad School,’” p.
That arrangement was unprecedented in Navy experience. S. services came to accept, at least in principle, the need for a single jurisdiction over allied air power in Desert Storm. Yet three of them (not only the Navy but also the Marine Corps and Army) frequently chafed at the extent of authority given to General Horner to select targets and determine the details of ﬂight operations. 1 Navy F-14s also were not assigned to the choicest combat air patrol (CAP) stations in Desert Storm because, having been equipped for the less-crowded outer air battle in defense of the carrier battle group, they lacked the redundant onboard target recognition systems that the rules of engagement 1 James A.
The A-7 and F/A-18 could also carry and deliver LGBs but only with the enabling support of nearby A-6Es that could laserdesignate their targets for them, which was not an advisable tactic in heavily defended enemy airspace. Moreover, to remain safely above the enemy’s man-portable infrared SAM and antiaircraft artillery (AAA) threat envelopes, they were required to operate solely from a stand2 Vice Admiral William A. Owens, USN, “The Quest for Consensus,” Proceedings, May 1994, p. 68. 3 The Navy’s electro-optically guided Walleye munition could be used only in daylight and in visual meteorological conditions.