By David T. Moore

Analysts and analysts alone create intelligence. Although technological marvels assist analysts by cataloging and presenting data, information and evidence in new ways, they do not do analysis. To be most effective, analysts need an overarching, reflective framework to add structured reasoning to sound, intuitivethinking. "Critical thinking" provides such a framework and goes further, positively influencing the entire intelligence analysis process. Analysts who adopt critical thinking stand to improve their analysis. This paper defines critical thinking in the context of intelligence analysis, explains how it influences the entireintelligence process, explores how it toughens the art of intelligence analysis, suggests how it may be taught, and deduces how analysts can be persuaded to adopt this habit.

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Concessions, protection of Cuba from invasion, and either conventional or nuclear war. S. military. S. forces were formidable. He also apparently concluded that the missiles – and the other forces – would be adequate to the task of successfully satisfying his purposes; the United States, faced with 98 Allison and Zelikow, Essence of Decision, 88. html>, last accessed 20 April 2006. Ironically, Khrushchev was wrong. History sided with his adversaries. 100 Cited in Garthoff, Reflections, 23. 100 Gribkov, “The View,” 4.

Under these circumstances, the adversary then can engage in deceptive practices that can lead an 10 intelligence service to misinterpret that adversary’s intentions. S. Intelligence Community before the former’s 1998 nuclear test. S. S. sought and was able to obscure them until after the test. Then, the Indian government boasted of its 11 success. Abduction forces a close consideration of the evidence at hand. ” Only then can an assessment of accuracy be determined. ” Despite their individual limitations, induction, deduction, and abduction taken together offer a means of thoroughly examining evidence in order to arrive at accurate intelligence conclusions.

Khrushchev’s point of view was that the United States (and its allies) were a threat to Communism everywhere and needed to be contained. He was presented with a confluence of opportunities and responded with the military buildup in Cuba and the deployment of the missiles. He apparently assumed that if he could get nuclear missiles into Cuba he’d have bargaining points useful in such a containment strategy. Later, Khrushchev believed he could effect a 100 change in the balance of power between the two nations.

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