By Cynthia Grabo, Jan Goldman
Guide of caution Intelligence: Assessing the probability to nationwide defense used to be written throughout the chilly battle and labeled for forty years, this handbook is now on hand to students and practitioners attracted to either background and intelligence. Cynthia Grabo, writer of the abridged model, waiting for shock: research for Strategic caution, is going into element at the basics of intelligence research and forecasting. The booklet discusses the issues of army research, difficulties of realizing particular difficulties of political, civil and financial research and assessing what it capability for analysts to have _warning judgment._
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Extra info for Handbook of Warning Intelligence: Assessing the Threat to National Security (Scarecrow Professional Intelligence Education)
There must be something more (or less) than meets the eye. A major portion of this treatise is devoted to a discussion of the relationship of facts and indications to warning, so these problems will not be elaborated here. Using the analogy with the courtroom case, however, we may note a number of possible reasons why the mere presentation of facts or evidence or statements of eyewitnesses may not produce a convincing case for the jury or a conviction: • The statements of the prosecution’s key witness are disputed by other witnesses.
There is still another difference to be noted between the current intelligence and warning processes, and that is the nature and content of the reporting. Since the primary function of the current analyst is not to write warning intelligence but to produce good current items, he will necessarily have to omit from his daily reporting a large number of indications or potential indications. There may be a variety of reasons for this, such as: the indications are individually too tenuous or contradictory, some of them are not current, there are just too many to report them all, they don’t make a good current story, and a number of them (sometimes the most important) are too classified for the usual current intelligence publication or the analyst is otherwise restricted from using them.
Regrettably, crises or potential crises tend to generate this type of reporting, for at least three different reasons. First, the collection system itself is usually geared up, so that more sources are sought whose knowledgeability or reliability is uncertain or cannot yet be determined. Secondly, the knowledge of a crisis in itself will generate a lot of “volunteer” reporting, which may range from very good to totally undepend- Warning and Collection 33 able, including some which may be the product of “paper mills” whose sole reason for existence is to fabricate reports for money.