By John Koster
Lately declassified facts and never-before-translated files inform the true tale of the day that FDR memorably declared might stay in infamy, exploring how Joseph Stalin and the KGB used an enormous community of double brokers and communist sympathizers—most significantly Harry Dexter White—to lead Japan into conflict opposed to the us, offering Soviet involvement at the back of the bombing of Pearl Harbor.
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Additional info for Operation Snow: How a Soviet Mole in FDR's White House Triggered Pearl Harbor
Part of the decline is due, of course, to our reduction in purchases from all countries. S. are not declining much. They are about 10 million dollars. . S. & freeze her dollar balances. This was done at the Pres. wishes. It remains unknown outside the Treasury. ” He had shown no fondness for Japan as the most progressive nation in Asia and no sympathy with Japanese hostility to Russian or Soviet expansion into Asia. White saved Sundays for his wife and daughters and even taught young Jewish men about their traditions on Saturday, but he drank little, partied less, and read a great deal, besides conferring with State Department officials—some of them communists or fellow travelers and others patriotic Democrats or Republicans who did not know White himself was a Soviet agent of influence.
Soldiers in the Pacific. When their regimental 70-millimeter howitzers failed to knock out Soviet tanks, the Japanese swarmed over the older, slower Red Army tanks like ants on candy and blew them up with hand grenades or “Molotov cocktails”—wine bottles filled with gasoline and wicks made of oily rags that set the tank engines on fire and roasted the crews alive. The Russians—still numb after the NKVD purge that had wiped out half their officer corps the year before—had never seen soldiers like this and did not like what they saw.
S. would not enact restrictions on Japanese immigration (as it had done with Chinese immigration in the 1880s), and San Francisco would end its segregation of Asian students. In return, Japan would on its own halt the immigration of its nationals to the United States. The Japanese glumly swallowed the insult and turned their attention to consolidating their hold on Korea. In 1909, the former Japanese prime minister and resident general of Korea, Hirobumi Ito, who had demanded concessions from Korea at gunpoint but stopped short of outright annexation, was assassinated by a Korean patriot gunman in Manchuria, then controlled by tsarist Russia.